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The idea that  "progress breeds not welfare but  catastrophe"  (Bury, 1932)
is deep-seated.  Since the  19th Century, America has  felt  the tension of
technological change,  and  foreboding at  its prospects  for Man's place in
Nature.  Hawthorne's  "The Celestial Railroad" (1843)  treats  the  locomotive
engine as  a symbol of sublime progress  toward a celestial garden which leads
ultimately toward a demonic catastrophe.
The sweet breezes  of  this  happy clime  came  refreshingly to  our
nostrils;  we beheld the glimmering gush of  silver fountains,  overhung
by trees  of beautiful  foliage and delicious  fruit, which were propo-
gated by grafts  from the celestial gardens  ...  The engine now
announced the close vicinity of  the  final station-house by one  last
and horrible scream, in which there seemed to be  distinguishable every
kind of wailing and woe, and bitter fierceness  of  wrath, all mixed up
with the wild laughter of  a devil or a madman (p. 305).
A similar ambivalence about technology's  impact on the  environment may be
traced through much of modern literature.- /
While economists are no strangers  to  ambivalence,  the  purpose of  this
essay  is  not  literary but analytical.  It extends  the model of  induced
innovation in agriculture  to include the  impacts  of  technology  on environ-
mental quality, developing a framework within which both technological  opti-
mists and technological pessimists can constructively argue.  The elements
of  this framework are all familiar.  Its purpose  is  to synthesize aspects of
the literature on technical choice in agriculture with work on environmental
quality.
1/  In The Machine in the Garden:  Technology  and the Pastoral Ideal in
America  (1964),  Leo Marx  traces  this  theme, weaving social and  literary
analysis that  includes discussions  of  a wide  range of American and
English authors.-2-
Part one  presents the model  of  induced innovation in  agriculture devel-
oped by Hayami and Ruttan  (1985)  and others.  This model explains  tech-
nological change as  responsive to  relative factor  abundance, which
determines  factor prices  and  the choice of  agricultural  technique.  An
example is provided using land, water and energy as  factor  inputs,  comparing
the adoption of dryland cropping and irrigation-intensive agricultural
technologies.
Part two argues  that the  technology chosen affects  the quality of  fac-
tor inputs.  Irrigation technology,  for example, may affect  the  quality of
water resources  once adopted.  A model of  such environmental quality effects
is  presented based on the characteristics  of  factors,  following Lancaster
(1966).  For purposes of  illustration, water quality characteristics are
described using an hedonic framework,  drawing on studies in which the  impli-
cit prices of  such characteristics  are  derived and  used  to  identify inverse
demand functions  (Freeman, 1979).
Part  three explores  the problem of  the market's  failure  to  reflect  the
scarcity value of  these  environmental quality characteristics.  If  a
complete set of  markets for  them exists,  then the market price and implicit
price of  environmental quality  attributes will  coincide.  If  markets  are
missing  (externalities or public goods exist)  then they will not coincide
and overuse or underuse  of  the factor  (and technology) may result.  Where
markets are missing, an incentive exists  to  innovate nonmarket  institutions
(such as  regulations)  to accurately reflect  the implicit  value of  the  attri-
bute  in  the use of  the  factor.  Institutional innovations affecting  factor
use  in agriculture  are  thus  linked  to  the environmental impacts  of  tech-
nological choice.-3-
Part four argues  that  this model  is  consistent with Ruttan's  (1971)
observation that  environmental quality is  a bundle of  characteristics which
will be more highly valued as incomes increase.  The income elasticity of
demand for environmental quality suggests  that these  characteristics will
become increasingly important with increases  in economic growth and  develop-
ment, and that where markets  for them are missing, especially in high income
countries, institutional innovations (such as  the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act) will further impinge on factor valuation, and thus  on  technical
choice in agriculture.
Part five draws together the analysis with some implications for
policy.  First, environmental quality concerns will increasingly affect  the
choice of agricultural technique.  The  relative  tendency of  high income
groups and countries  to value environmental quality more than agricultural
production has both domestic and international policy implications.  Second,
the impact of  environmental quality on technical  choice in agriculture  is
closely related  to missing markets, and institutional  innovations will  be
driven by these market failures.  The  role of  policy is accurately  to
characterize these market failures,  and to propose cost-effective institu-
tional alternatives.  Third, policy interventions  should be  targeted  to
specific cases in which markets are missing.  Both the efficiency and equity
of  market and quasi-market alternatives should  be weighed against regula-
tions as  a basis  for accurate  signalling of  technical choices  in relation  to
environmental quality.-4-
Induced Innovation in Agriculture
Technological choice is  a function of  the  relative abundance  of  factors
of  production, which determine factor prices and the  choice of  agricultural
technique.  This  is  the  "induced innovation hypothesis,"  first  advanced by
Hicks  (1932) and subsequently elaborated by Fellner  (1961,  1962),  Kennedy
(1964),  Ahmad  (1966),  and Samuelson (1965)  among others.  In agriculture,
the theory has been most  fully developed by Hayami and Ruttan (1985)  and
Binswanger and Ruttan  (1978).  The induced innovation hypothesis treats
technology not  as given, but  as a dynamic endogenous response  to changes  in
resource endowments  and to growth in product  demand.  Such  a dynamic process
accounts for  the way in which constraints  on factor inputs  such  as  land,
water, and energy  affect the agricultural technology chosen, and how the
demand for agricultural output drives  the demand for new technology.
Hicks' theory of  induced  innovation implied that a rise  in the price of
one  factor relative to another  (a function of  their relative abundance)
induces a sequence of  technical  changes  that  economizes on  the use  of  the
expensive (scarce) factor relative to  the use of  the  other (abundant) fac-
tor.  Hence, constraints  on economic growth imposed by  relative  scarcity  are
overcome by  technical changes  that  substitute  relatively abundant  factor
inputs  for scarce ones.  Criticism of  the  theory  concerned  the apparent  lack
of a microeconomic mechanism triggering this  sequence  (see Hayami and
Ruttan, 1985,  pp.  73-114).  In  response, Binswanger has developed an induced
innovation model based on microeconomic reasoning, in which innovation
possibilities are  triggered  by research and  development  (Binswanger and
Ruttan, 1978).  More research into  new technologies  is  induced by  increases
in product demand, which shifts the  "innovation possibilities curve."  The-5-
choice of  a specific technique is  then guided by  relative factor scarcity.
Consider Figure 1, in which land, water and energy  are  factor inputs,
00 and DD are the price lines associated with differing endowments of  land
and water, the dotted curves IPC o and IPC1 represent  innovation  possibili-
ties curves and isoquants Io and 11 represent particular agricultural  pro-
duction technologies chosen in situations 0 and 1 respectively.  The
straight  line  [W,E]  assumes  a fixed complementarity between water and
energy,  based on the reasoning that bringing more water to crop production
requires more energy.  IPCo represents  the technological possibilities  asso-
ciated with relatively abundant  land and relatively  scarce water, such as
dryland cropping on the High Plains prior to large scale pumping from  the
Ogallala Aquifer  (see Kneese,  1986).  The particular technology  in use,  Io,
is  one in a set of  possible techniques falling inside the envelope of  IPC o.
I  is  a cost-minimizing technology when it  is  tangent at point X to 00.
Given the particular factor prices prevailing at  00, Lo, Wo,  and Eo  are  the
implied levels of land, water and  energy used by  the particular dryland
cropping technology Io .
Now suppose that water becomes more abundant relative  to land,  due  to
increased extraction from underground water sources, as  on  the High Plains
or  in the Central Sands  region of Wisconsin during the  1960's  and  1970's.
This  is reflected in the new price  line, DD, in which the  change  in relative
factor scarcity is shown.  Also assume that  the  relative price of  energy
falls  compared with  land.  The  change  from 00  to DD induces  research by
agricultural engineers and  others  into a new set  of  irrigation technologies
that  are water and energy using, such as  center-pivot  irrigationQ  \  I
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technology.-/ This  innovation process, reinforced by  increased  demand for
agricultural  output, leads  to an inward shift  in  the  innovation possibili-
ties curve from IPCo  to IPC 1,  implying efficiency improvements.  Within
these new innovation possibilities, the  particular technology chosen is I1,
at point Y, with L1, W1 and E1 representing the  levels  of  land, water and
energy used to produce comparable quantities  of output  in  the new situation.
The  overall relationship  between factor scarcity and  the direction of
innovation is  shown in Figure 2 (see Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978).  Given a
fixed production function, relative  factor prices are shown by  the alter-
native sets of  parallel lines  DD, 00  and ZZ.  Point P is  the existing input-
output combination.  As  in Figure  1, 00 represents relatively abundant  land
and scarce water, DD  relatively abundant water and scarce  land,  and ZZ
represents an intermediate  situation.
If  it  is assumed that  research can alter the existing input-output  com-
bination in any of  three directions, represented  by  the arrows  a, b and c,
then this  opportunity  set defines  the innovation possibilities.  Each arrow
indicates  the distance by which a given innovation moves  the input-output
combination from reference point P.  Hence, activity  a is  highly water-
saving, activity c is  highly  land-saving, and activity b is  an intermediate
innovation.  If water is  cheap relative  to  land  (factor price line  DD),  then
water-using activities such as  c will result  in greater cost reductions  than
1/  First developed  in  1950,  center-pivot irrigation consists of  a series
of water sprinklers mounted  on a six-inch pipe that  is  in turn sup-
ported by a row of  seven or  more mobile  towers.  Water is  pumped
through  the pipe  from a source, and  the  towers  carry  the  system around the center pivot.  Compared with dryland cropping,  center-pivots are
water using,  energy intensive and  land and labor saving (Mackenzie,
1983,  p. 5).Q
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water-saving activities such as  a.  If  relative  factor scarcities  shift the
price line from DD to ZZ,  and from ZZ  to 00, water-saving and land-using
activities such as b and a are increasingly  preferred  to water-using and
land-saving technologies such as  c.  These results follow from the  fact  that
the expected benefit  from an innovation activity is  the sum of  reductions in
input requirements weighted by  the  price of  each factor.  Water saved times
its price, plus land saved times  its price, will induce cost-minimizing
agents to adopt water-using and land-saving technologies whenever water is
cheap relative to land.  Binswanger and Ruttan (1978) and Hayami and Ruttan
(1985) develop full models of  this process, taking into account  not only
changes  in factor prices  but product prices,  scale of  output, innovation
costs, and market size.
Criticisms  of  the induced innovation hypothesis have been advanced
because it  is  often interpreted to depend on accurate signaling of resource
scarcity by market prices.  As  the  above analysis emphasizes,  it  is rela-
tive scarcity, rather than  market prices,  which is  the  fundamental  basis of
the theory.  Market prices may not  reflect  this scarcity  due to exter-
nalities or other market  failures.  However, these market  failures  them-
selves create incentives  to innovate institutions which allow actual  (or
perceived) relative scarcities  to be  reflected (for a discussion see
Crosson, 1986, and comments  by  Runge).  The theory  of  induced technological
innovation in agriculture must therefore  be augmented by treating institu-
tions  as well as technology as endogenous.
It was this  realization that  led Hayami and Ruttan to  the  complementary
concept of  "induced institutional innovation."  Institutions  "are the rules
of  society or of  organizations  that  facilitate coordination among people  by-8-
helping them form expectations  which each person can reasonably hold  in
dealing with others"  (Hayami and Ruttan,  1985,  p. 94).  The  demand for  this
coordination arises from the need for assured benefits streams,  now and  in
the  future,  in the form of rules of  exclusion and inclusion which institu-
tions supply  (Runge, 1984a,  1984b).
In  the absence of  dictatorship,  institutions must generally result  from
collective action of  one  sort or another.  Collective action involves  the
innovation of  new rules regulating individual and group behavior.  The supply
of  such new rules will be  influenced by  the  cost of  achieving consensus and/or
suppressing opposition (Olson, 1965).  In  some cases,  this  may mean  developing
new property rights  in connection with factors  of  production including land,
water, or energy.  In other cases,  especially where externalities  and public
goods are concerned, collective action in the form of  other nonmarket  insti-
tutions may  be  required, in which substantial political costs  must  be
incurred to  enact new taxes,  subsidies  or other rules and regulations.
The remainder of  this paper is  devoted  to  the  interaction of  tech-
nological and institutional innovations,  in which technical choices induce
institutional reforms  in laws  and regulations affecting agriculture.  The
demand for  institutional change is  often derived from technological  change,
as  the discussion of environmental regulation below will show.  The  key ele-
ment  linking technological  choice  and institutional innovation in  the  model
below is  not only  the relative  scarcity of  factors measured in  terms  of
quantity, but  the effect  of  initial choices  of  technology, such as  center-
pivot irrigation, on the quality  of  factor  inputs.-  By accounting for  such
1/  This  linkage, especially in  the  case  of water quality, was  suggested by
S.V.  Ciriacy-Wantrup  (1961).-9-
qualitative effects,  the induced  innovation model is  expanded and enriched.
At  the same time,  where these qualitative  impacts  are unreflected  in market
prices, a reason is  provided why  technical choices in agriculture are  not
guided by  market institutions  alone.  Quality effects of  technical choice
may be an important  form of  missing market.  The institutions  induced by
these missing markets,  including environmental regulations, may  increasingly
constrain the choice of  agricultural  technique.-10-
Technological Choice and Environmental Quality
Consider a two-stage model of  technological choice  in agriculture.  Let
there  be  two types  of  activity.  The first is  agricultural production using
land, water and energy  to  produce  food;  the second is  consumption.  There
are  two types of agents:  farmers and consumers.  Some agents  (farmers) are
both producers and consumers.  Consumers demand food produced by  farmers.
They  also consider the quality of  land and water direct  consumption goods
giving rise  to utility.  Farmers and  consumers  may both consider water as  a
consumption good while farmers  also consider it  as a factor  input.  The  con-
sequence of producer-consumer externalities  resulting from this  interdepen-
dence will be  considered below.
In the first stage,  relative factor scarcity determines  technical choices
for producers.  In  the terms  considered above  the relative scarcity  of  land,
water and energy can be used  to explain research into alternative technologies
such as  center-pivot irrigation.  In  the Central  Sand Counties  of  Wisconsin,
for example, unreliable rainfall,  low water-holding capacity  of  the  soil,
high commodities prices, and abundant underground water sources encouraged
University of Wisconsin research during the  1950's  and  1960's  into  the
application of new irrigation technologies  and subsequently rapid adoption
of center-pivots.  In  1974  irrigated acreage in these counties was  10  times
what  it was in  1945, while  from 1974  to  1977  alone  irrigated acreage grew by
60 percent.  During the  same period, acreage  irrigated with center-pivot
technology  increased nationally  by  61.9  percent  (Sloggett, 1979).- /
1/  Once such choices  are  made and capital  is  tied up  in them, they  persist
until new relative factor prices  are  clearly established.  These con-
cerns have led Frederick  (1980),  among others,  to argue in favor  of
careful attempts to  accurately evaluate changing water and  land  scar-
cities.  However, even perfect foresight with  respect  to quantitative
scarcity would be insufficient  if qualitative considerations  entered
individual utility functions.-11-
A second stage effect of  a technological choice such as  center-pivot
technology is  on the  quality of  factors,  such as water,  that enter indivi-
dual utility functions  as  direct consumption goods.  Center-pivot  irriga-
tion, for example, affects  the quality of  water as  a consumption good for
non-agricultural purposes.  In  the  case of Wisconsin, the  coarse-grained
sandy soils of  the Central Sand Counties  hold less  than an  inch  of water per
foot, and are quite permeable  in most areas, where  groundwater is  near the
surface.  Hence, although the quantitative abundance of  water as  a factor of
production encourages irrigated crop production,  it  also encourages irriga-
tion at  levels which have contributed  to leaching of  nitrate through  the
sandy soils and  into groundwater sources  (Griffin and Bromley, 1981).  This
leaching has  led  to nitrate contamination of  local water supplies,  reducing
the quality of water, despite the fact  that quantity has  remained  largely
unaffected.  Although the example  is specific,  the phenomenon is  general:
technical choices in  agriculture may affect  the quality of  factors  and  thus
the physical environment.  As  Saliba (1985)  observes, quality  and quantity
of groundwater are not separable, making careful appraisal of  specific water
quality characteristics crucial  to  the evaluation  of alternative agri-
cultural  production techniques.
In order to  capture  these impacts  of  technological  choice on consump-
tion, we need  to define  factors  that also serve  as  direct consumption goods.
in terms  of  their characteristics.  Following Lancaster  (1966),  the  charac-
teristics  of water may be  treated as  a bundle of  the form:
(1)  Zw =  (z1,  z2 , ..., Zj  ..., zn)
where Zw is a vector of  consumption  (and/or production) characteristics
defining water resources  and  (zl,  ... ,  zji  ... , zn ) are  particular charac--12-
teristics such as salinity, rate of  flow and nitrate levels.  The use  of
such characteristics models  to measure  qualitative differences giving rise
to  utility in  the  consumer choice  literature  is well-developed  (see Deaton
and Muellbauer,  1980, pp.  243-272;  Ladd and Suvannunt,  1976).  For purposes
of  illustration, I shall use  an application of  these models  pioneered by
Griliches  (1971)  and widely used in  the  literature on environmental quality.
This is  the hedonic price estimation model.
The hedonic technique  is  a method  for estimating the  implicit price of
characteristics  such as water quality.  If  water is  differentiated by  its
degree of  nitrate pollution, for example,  then one of  its  characteristics
(zj)  might  be  the level  of  nitrates.  Letting W represent water as  before,
and Z  its  vector of quality characteristics  in a given area (such as  the
Central Sands  or High Plains),  if water quality varies  from place to  place,
the  differences  in these  characteristics will be  revealed in  its  price  if a
market for water exists.  Even  if water is  a public good, or externalities
indicate missing markets,  the  implicit price of water quality  charac-
teristics may be revealed  if water  is  weakly complementary with a good which
is  traded  in private markets  (Maler, 1974).  A typical example  is  the  esti-
mated impact of  water quality  characteristics  on property values  in  which a
market for  property  is presumed  to  exist.  Because this  approach is  widely
used, it  will  be  briefly developed here  (for  expositions,  see Freeman,  1979;
Feenberg and Mills,  1980).
Assume  that each consumer derives utility from consumption of  the
characteristics of  a composite  commodity, water quality  characteristics,  and
a flow of other  characteristics  from property.  To  the potential  consumer of
property,  the  flow of  services  from  it  is  a function of  characteristics  such-13-
as distance from metropolitan areas, soils,  etc.  Let ZD  be  the vector of
distance characteristics and let ZS be  the vector of  soil characteristics  in
the area in which the property is  located.  Finally, let Zw be  the  level of
water quality, defined in terms  of  individual characteristics (such as
nitrate levels)  that are  relevant to  consumer choice.  We may then state the
flow of services  from property as
(2)  P - P(ZD, ZS,  Zw).
If  it  is  assumed that  the area under study  constitutes a single  property
market with sufficient variation in  these characteristics  to  show measurably
different responses,  and that  individuals are informed and free to  choose
property based on its  characteristics,  then it  is possible  to infer inverse
demand functions for water quality characteristics from preferences revealed
in the property market.
The price  (or rent)  of a given parcel  i of  property, Ri,  can be
expressed as a function of  the vectors  of characteristics  for  that  site
(3)  Ri  =  R(ZD,  ZS,  Zw)
Recall that
-w  (z  11  z2I  ...  zP  .... Z ) Zw  1'  2'  · "' aj'  '  Zn)
where zj  is  a specific characteristic such as  water nitrate levels,  and zl,
z2 , etc. are other water quality characteristics.
The hedonic procedure is  first  to  estimate an hedonic function  for  (3)
which explains the price  (or rent)  of  property in terms  of  its  various
aRi
characteristics.  The partial derivative  -- gives  the implicit marginal
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Note  that  -a  gives  the implicit marginal price  of nitrate levels  on pro-
i
perty values.  In principle, equilibrium results when marginal willingness
to pay  by  consumers  for a given characteristic zj  or vector  of  charac-
teristics Zw is equal to  the marginal  implicit price.
To derive  the inverse demand function for water quality characteristic
j (nitrates) on property parcel i, it  is  necessary  to  combine  the  implicit
prices  revealed for water quality with the usual determinants  of demand:
consumers'  income and tastes and preferences.  If  it  is  hypothesized  that
consumers' demand  price  (willingness  to pay) for water quality is  a function
of  Zw, income M, and other variables  affecting tastes  and  preferences,  in-
cluding ZD and ZS,  then the demand  function  may be  expressed as weakly separable
in the  property market,  so  that the  prices of  goods  other than property can
be  omitted from the willingness  to pay for property parcel  i (Freeman, pp.
124-125).  The equilibrium condition equating the implicit marginal price of
water quality to marginal willingness  to  pay for  characteristic j then gives
willingness  to pay  (WTP) for water quality on property parcel i as
aRi
(4)  WTPij  a=  z  f(Zw,  ZD,  ZS  M)
J-15-
The conditions for estimating this willingness  to  pay function are
quite strict, and have led  to  numerous criticisms of  the hedonic method and
alternative proposals  for the measurement of  environmental quality
(Brookshire et.  al.,  1982;  Hanemann, 1980;  Mendelson and Brown,  1983;
Caulkins,  et.  al.,  1984).-/  All such measures  seek to  capture qualitative
determinants of demand as well as  income  effects.
For the purposes  of  this  exposition, the key objective  is  to  relate  the
literature on the estimation  of environmental quality characteristics  to  the
induced innovation model of  technological choice.  If  technological choice
in agriculture creates environmental quality effects, and these  effects  have
implicit  prices for consumers of water, then such qualitative effects  can be
estimated by  the hedonic or some  other method.  The crucial point is  that
the  impact of agricultural producers' choices on the quality of consumption
may in turn affect  the market  for factors such as  water to  the producers
themselves.  The mechanism leading from consumers'  demand for water quality
characteristics back  to producers' choice  of  technique may be  the market  or
other institutions depending largely  on  the  extent  to which implicit  prices
are revealed by  the market mechanism itself.  Where they are  not,  a market
failure or missing market  is  said to  exist, and nonmarket signals may  prove
more significant than market signals.
1/  As Freeman notes  (1979,  pp.  125-127) non-linearity in equation (3) is
required for (4).  If  all  consumers are identical, then incomes and
utility functions do not  vary across  consumers, and  the willingness  to
pay  function (4) is  identical with  (3).  Where these  two special  cases
do not hold, the supply  side of  the  market  for water quality  must be
examined.  Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978) argue  that  if  the  supply of  a good such as air or water quality is  perfectly inelastic with respect
to price  or willingness  to  pay at  each property  location, then quality
is independent  of  consumers'  willingness  to  pay,  and equation  (4) is a
fully identified demand  curve, at  least  in  the short and  intermediate
run.-16-
Market Failure and Institutional Innovation
The market is  an institution, one  in  a set of  institutions that  coor-
dinates expectations of  outcomes by signaling  the intentions of agents.
Markets do this  through price signaling.  Although it  comes  as  no surprise
to non-economists, there are  institutions  other than  the market  that also
provide coordination, supporting and often complementing the  functioning of
markets themselves.  Whenever markets  fail accurately to signal agents, an
incentive exists to  innovate non-market institutions  that will do  the job of
coordination.  Of  course, these signals may involve more than the equation
of marginal values.  Not only efficiency but equity must often be assured.
This signaling, whether by markets or  by  non-market institutions, is not
costless.  Although this point  is most often made in connection with
government  institutions-(eg. Wolf,  1979),  markets  too are not  free of
charge.  Absent  the convenient artifice of  the Walrasian auctioneer, markets
require  their own costly  forms  of  collective action  to  function.  In
reality, the auctioneer must  be  both appointed and  paid.
It  is  well known that a full set  of  markets  for water quality charac-
teristics does  not exist.  If  the implicit  price of water quality charac-
teristics is  fully reflected either in  the price of  water itself, or  in  some
weakly complementary private good such as  property values, we can argue  that
these implicit  price signals are  a sufficient basis  for the allocation of
water quality according to willingness  to pay.  Property values can signal
the  implicit marginal value of  water quality  to consumers  of property, and
act,  in equilibrium, to efficiently allocate environmental quality charac-
teristics.  However, the implicit price  of water quality characteristics is
not generally  fully reflected  in property values.  And a market  (or markets)-17-
for water quality characteristics themselves is  (are) likely  to be missing.
In such cases,  the signaling process performed  by  the price system,
including implicit prices estimated by  hedonic methods, will not  equate
marginal willingness  to pay with this marginal  implicit price.
aRi
(5) WT"ij  az
The reasons  for  these missing markets are potentially large  (see Saliba,
1985).  Even if  the quantitative  scarcity of  water is accurately signaled  to
agricultural producers, leading to  the adoption of efficient  irrigation
technologies,  there need be no assurance that  the qualitative impacts of
this choice of  technique on water quality are accurately  signaled either to
farmers or consumers.  Because qualitative effects  are often more difficult
to measure and perceive, there  is  reason to believe  that markets  for  them
are  indeed missing on grounds.of  imperfect information  (see Dahlman, 1979;
Runge and Myers, 1985).
In  the face of  such missing markets,  an incentive  is  created by  the
disequilibrium reflected in inequality (5) to develop  institutions  capable
of achieving a level of  efficiency unachievable by  existing institutions
alone.1/ This incentive to  innovate institutions arises  because marginal
willingness to pay for water quality is  greater than its marginal implicit
price as  reflected in property values.  The result is  that government sub-
sidies,  taxes, or regulations  on  property may be  innovated in order to
achieve the equivalence between willingness  to pay  and water quality's
marginal implicit price.
1/  A familiar result  in environmental externalities  theory  is  that  there
exists a correspondence  between a tax-subsidy scheme  to  internalize a
(Pigouvian) externality  and a particular set  of  regulations which will
achieve  the same  effect  (see Dales,  1968;  Baumol and Oates,  1975).-18-
Of  course, the development of  these institutions  is  not  costless.  As
Buchanan and Stubblebine originally emphasized,  costs may exceed benefits,
and the missing market may  be Pareto-irrelevant.  However,  the fact  that  it
is  irrelevant on the grounds of Pareto-efficiency does  not  obviate the
possibility that  institutional  innovations may arise  from concerns  of  equity
or fairness  (Runge and von Witzke,  1986).  If farmers  are  perceived as
receiving an inequitable share  of  the  benefits of water resources and
consumers' willingness  to pay  for water quality exceeds  its marginal impli-
cit  price as signaled by the market,  then even if  the costs of  institutions
assuring this equity  exceed their benefits, equity or  fairness may  be used
to justify collective action to constrain  the subsequent technological
choices  of agricultural producers.
Consider the following sequence.  Extensive irrigation leads  to nitrate
pollution of groundwater.  Despite continued abundance of water as  an  agri-
cultural input, declining water quality affects  some  consumers' health.-/
If  consumers  value water quality highly, and are willing to  pay for  it  at
levels  in excess of  those reflected in property values,  this  disequilibrium
creates  incentives for institutional  innovation in  the  form of  taxes,  sub-
sidies, or  regulations  that constrain groundwater or  fertilizer use  by  agri-
cultural producers,  in effect  raising the  relative  factor price  of  water in
production.  If  enacted, these measures  reduce  farmers'  incentive to  con-
tinue water-using irrigation methods.  New research is  stimulated  into less
water-using irrigation techniques, inducing a new round  of water-conserving
1/  The primary health effects  associated with nitrate pollution are methe-
moglobinemia  (Blue baby syndrome)  and gastric cancer (see Griffin and
Bromley, 1981).-19-
technological innovations,  such as  drip-irrigation.  In  Figure 3, the effect
is equivalent to a shift  from price  line DD,  reflecting  relative factor
abundance for water, to  a new one such as  ZZ (also shown in Figure  2 above).
Figure 3 shows how a new  round of research responding to  the new regulatory
or  tax-subsidy constraints then induces innovation possibilities such as
IPC 2,  and new techniques such  as  12.
This may be thought of  as a third stage  in the process of  induced  inno-
vation, triggered by missing markets  for environmental quality charac-
teristics.  These missing markets  feed back  to affect subsequent  choices of
agricultural technique.  In  effect, institutional changes are  consumers'
response to the environmental quality impacts of  agricultural technology.
These impose costs on producers, altering relative factor prices and
inducing subsequent changes  in agricultural technology.  Both technology and
institutions are  thus endogenously linked to  changes  in the  relative scar-
city of  factors  and changes  in environmental quality.-
The range of  possible institutional innovations  is  large, and  need not
include coercive government action or regulation.  In the  case considered
here,  the relative costs of  various institutional alternatives  affecting
water quality may make centralized government  regulation far  less attractive
than local water users associations and/or the use  of quasi-market  or newly
created market institutions  (Anderson, et.  al.,  1983).  In short,  the
relative  costs of these  institutional alternatives are  as  relevant  as  they
1/  In  the case of  irrigation, recent  evidence confirms  declining U.S.
rates of  increase in  its  use,  although  the  exact causes  require further
investigation.  According to a recent USDA  study by  Sloggett  (reported
in Agweek, 1986,  p. 58):  "Higher costs  are making farmers  take a closer
look at  conservation, including ways  of  recovering irrigation runoff
and use of  low-pressure  center-pivot  irrigation systems."0
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are  in the choice of technology.  However, because institutional choices
involve collective actions  that  may be affected, indeed dominated, by  con-
siderations of  equity rather than efficiency, governmental rather than non-
governmental institutions may often be  chosen despite  their costs  in
efficiency terms.- / Considerations  of equity and  fairness are also  linked
to  the distribution of  income within and  across societies.
1/  Ruttan (1971, p. 712)  has stated:  "Redirection of  technical effort  in
response to  the  rising economic value  of  environmental services will
involve complex interaction between technical and institutional change.
Extension of  the theory of  induced innovation to  include the  process  of
institutional innovation adds significantly to  our understanding of
this process.  It  seems consistent with historical experience to view
institutional change  as resulting from efforts of economic units
(households, firms, bureaus) to internalize the gains and externalize
the costs of economic activity and efforts by society to force economic
units to internalize the costs and externalize the gains.  Where  inter-
nalization of  the gains of  innovation activity are  difficult to
achieve,  institutional  innovations involving public sector activity
become essential"  [emphasis  in  original].-21-
Changes in Income and the Demand for Environmental Quality
Ruttan (1971)  has argued that environmental quality  is a bundle of
characteristics  that will be more highly valued as  incomes increase.
[I]n  relatively high-income economies  the  income elasticity of demand for commodities  and services  related to sustenance is  low and declines as income  continues  to  rise, while the  income elasticity of
demand for more effective  disposal of  residuals  and for environmental
amenities is  high and  continues  to  rise.  This  is  in sharp  contrast  to the  situation in poor countries where  the income elasticity of  demand
is  high for sustenance and  low for environmental amenities.  The sense of  environmental crisis  in the  relatively affluent  countries at  this
time  stems  primarily from the dramatic growth in demand for environmen- tal amenities (pp.  707-8).
Two important  implications follow from this  argument.  First, by
Engels' Law, demand for  food production  ("sustenance")  at higher income
levels will be  proportionately less  than for  other goods.  If  environmental
quality is a superior good,  as Ruttan argues,  then  as  relative demand for
agricultural output falls with increases  in income,  demand  for environmental
quality will rise.  This  argument applies  to  the demand side only,  but is
reinforced on the supply  side by Smith  (1975), who has  emphasized that  the
irreversibility of  losses in environmental quality characteristics makes
them even more scarce  over time,  raising their relative  implicit value.
Second, this argument should be  valid both across  countries  (as Ruttan
intended it)  as well as  within countries,  so  that  higher income  groups
should demand more environmental quality characteristics,  ceteris  paribus,
than lower income groups.  The rising  income elasticity of  demand for
environmental quality characteristics I will distinguish as  Ruttan's Law,-22-
although Hirsch  (1976) also holds a claim.1/
These implications  are helpful  in explaining recent  trends  in the
environmental regulation of  agriculture.  Before exploring them from a
policy perspective, however, the significance of  changes  in income will  be
related to the model developed in previous sections.
Recall that  the inverse demand function derived from the hedonic
equation of  marginal willingness  to pay  for water quality  characteristics
such as  nitrates  (j) on a given property parcel (i) can  be expressed as  a
function of  the environmental and other characteristics  of  the parcel  (Zw,
ZD, ZS)  as well as income  (M).
aR
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Estimation of  this willingness  to  pay  function allows  empirical testing of
Ruttan's Law  that willingness  to  pay for water quality is  an increasing
function of  changes in income.  If  equilibrium between marginal willingness
to pay  and the marginal implicit price  of  environmental quality  is not
achieved due  to missing markets, yet  changes  in income are significant
explanatory factors  in the demand  for water quality characteristics,  one  can
1/  In Social Limits  to Growth (1976),  Hirsch argued that  "positional goods,"
including environmental quality,  are  (1) scarce in  some absolute  or
socially  imposed sense and  (2) subject  to congestion or crowding
through more extensive use.  If  positional goods  remain in fixed supply
as other goods  become more plentiful,  their price will  rise,  in  the
same way  suggested by  Smith (1975).  The tendency for  positional goods to increase in price, Hirsch  (p. 28)  observes,  "will be  reinforced if
rising incomes increase the demand for them faster  than for material
goods."  This  is  to  be  expected (1) because  the  use of  them involves
not  only effort  but  time,  a complementary superior good;  (2) because
primary material needs  including food have already been satisfied at
some threshold.  The  combined effect of  these influences  "is  that goods and  services sharing some or all  of  the characteristics  of  positional
goods  attract  an  increasing proportion of  family expenditure  as  family income  rises."-23-
speculate that higher income consumers and countries will  have the  greatest
incentive to  call for institutional innovations  to correct for  these missing
markets.
Interestingly, this should be  the  case  regardless of  the particular
institutional innovation sought as  a remedy.  If  income is  a significant
explanatory  variable, it  can  be  interpreted to  suggest that  debates  over
environmental quality characteristics, and  remedies  for  missing markets,
will revolve  (in high income  circles) not around whether something should be
done to  equate willingness  to pay  and  the implicit value of  environmental
quality, but what should be done  in  terms  of  the  costs  (and equity) of
alternative institutional arrangements.  Some  may favor government  regula-
tion over market or quasi-market  solutions, and others may have a preference
for regulation.  But environmental quality will  be a consensus  objective -
at least among high income  groups.
Correspondingly,  international debate over environmental quality will
occur primarily between high income countries  (such as  Canada, Western
Europe and the United States) rather than between low  income  countries.
Within countries  such as  the  U.S.,  the debate over institutional alter-
natives  will be  conducted primarily between "competing elites,"  represented
by groups  such as the Heritage Foundation on the  one hand, and Worldwatch
Institute on the other, with  the Nature Conservancy  and Sierra Club
somewhere in  the middle.  These groups will all  reflect upper income pre-
ferences for environmental quality, but  their preferred solutions may  vary
from newly  created markets  ("privatization")  to direct  government regula-
tion.-24-
In  contrast, as  incomes  rise, the growing weakness of  demand  for agri-
cultural products compared with environmental quality suggests that  the
value of  agricultural output will fall relative to  the  implicit price  of
environmental quality.  The case on efficiency grounds  for  intervention to
correct for missing markets  in agriculture will be weakened as  the  case  for
intervention to  correct  for missing markets  in environmental quality  charac-
teristics is strengthened  (see Myers, 1986).  We may think of  this as  the
interaction of Engel's Law  and Ruttan's Law.  Granting the  importance of
equity considerations relative  to efficiency suggests  that transfers  may
continue to the agricultural sector, but  that these transfers may be
increasingly undercut by a realization of  the  comparative efficiency gains
that could result from withdrawing transfers  from agricultural producers who
harm the environment.  This suggests that as  incomes  rise the  relative share
of political resources devoted to agriculture - not  only  by government  but
by private voluntary or lobbying groups - can  be expected to fall in  rela-
tion to  those devoted to environmental  quality.
Finally,  this analysis suggests that  whenever markets  for environmental
quality characteristics  are perceived  to be  missing and  institutional  inno-
vations are undertaken, the relative factor prices facing agricultural pro-
ducers may be altered, leading to new directions for agricultural research
and technology  that reflect  the higher value given to  these environmental
quality characteristics  (see English, et.  al.,  1984).  The Clean Water Act
provides  just one example  of  such an institutional innovation.  Recent
examples  of changing technological possibilities  partially induced by
changing institutional constraints  include no-till cultivation practices,
integrated pest management,  and a variety of more environmentally benign
herbicides and pesticides.-25-
Implications for Policy
An analytical approach has  been developed  to  describe endogenous  changes
in agricultural technology and  their  relationship  to environmental quality.
Three observations with relevance  for  policy result.  First, environmental
quality concerns will encroach on agricultural technology choices  to an
increasing extent in higher income countries,  but will  have  less effect  in
lower income countries  if  Engel's Law and Ruttan's Law are  valid.  Second,
this encroachment will affect  the choices  of  technique of  agricultural  pro-
ducers through market institutions in some cases,  and  through non-market
institutions in others, depending on the extent  to which markets  are missing
and the particular policy  response.  Third, the linkage between growth  in
incomes, food demand, and the demand for environmental quality suggests
that growth in incomes will create endogenous incentives  to  reduce  the harm-
ful environmental impacts of  agricultural technology.  Whether these incen-
tives  are sufficient  to avoid irreversible  environmental damages  from
technological innovation in agriculture  is  largely a question of  policy
design and execution.  Each of  these observations will be  considered in
turn.
In a recent policy analysis, Batie,  Shabman, and Kramer  (1986)  argue
that  output expanding agricultural technology is  increasingly perceived to
be a threat to environmental quality.  In  part as  a result,  institutions
innovated solely to support  the income of  producers engaged  in output  expan-
sion during earlier periods are now considered misdirected.  Erosion and
other environmental damages resulting from full-scale planting in response
to international demand, together with  the growth of  the environmental move-
ment, are identified as  major causes  of  the  shift in perception.-26-
The model developed above provides  a framework within which to
interpret this  shift from an economic perspective.  Technological  innova-
tions  of  the 1970's,  which responded to  the increased  food demands  (in large
part of  lower income  countries), prevented domestic adjustments which
Engel's Law would have  dictated if  U.S.  farmers  had  produced solely for
domestic markets.  Yet as  agricultural  output  (and technology) responded to
the export market boom, Ruttan's Law was also operating,  creating increasing
demands for environmental quality as  incomes rose.  The perception that
market forces  in agriculture  failed to account  adequately for environmental
quality characteristics  led to  support  for  institutional innovations
including environmental legislation such as  the Clean Water Act, creating a
new set of  constraints  for agricultural producers which conflicted with the
maximum output objectives associated with Earl Butz' famous  incantations  to
plant  "fencerow to fencerow."
These environmental quality constraints entered  the 1985  Farm Security
Act  in the  form of  cross-compliance,  strict  sodbuster language, and  the
acreage  retirement provisions of  the Conservation Reserve Program.  Such
institutional innovations were in large  part  the result  of  lobbying by
environmental interest groups with new and significant interests  in policy.
Although difficult to measure, it  would appear that  as  these groups gained
influence, the general farm organizations'  overall strength declined, almost
in inverse proportion.  The consequence of  these  institutional changes is a
new set of  constraints on agricultural  technology.  While considerable
disagreement  remains  over agricultural policies,  there  is  surprisingly
strong consensus  around environmental quality  as a policy objective  inside
and outside of  agriculture.  Evidence of willingness  to  pay  through higher-27-
taxes  for improvements  in environmental quality at  levels  in excess  of  those
reflected by  current policy are strongly supported by surveys  conducted by
Resources for the Future (1980)  and others.
These changing valuations and institutions  are  also being felt  in  the
redirection of  research priorities toward more environmentally benign  agri-
cultural technologies,  including no-till cultivation, more bio-degradable
pesticides and herbicides,  integrated pest  management, and, as  suggested by
the example above, more water-conserving forms  of irrigation technology.
If  the above analysis  is accurate, these pressures will be felt  less  at
lower levels  of  income both within and across countries.  Within the U.S.
and other high-income  countries,  this  suggests a "competing elites" model of
environmental policy.  Debates over environmental policy will be drawn  in
terms of what markets for environmental quality  characteristics are  missing,
and what forms  of  institutional innovation are  best able  to  replace them,
not about whether to do anything at  all.  Competing elites can be  expected
to range along a continuun from those favoring market  and quasi-market  solu-
tions to  those favoring direct  government regulation and control.
Negotiations between high income countries  such as  Canada, the United
States and the nations  of  Western Europe will also increasingly involve
environmental quality issues.  Recent discussions over acid rain are  an
example, suggesting how environmental quality impacts  of  (industrial)  tech-
nology induce demands  for  institutional innovation which may in turn trigger
new rounds  of  research and technological innovation to  reduce S02  emmissions
and improve air and water quality.
In  lower income countries,  however, the demand  for environmental
quality characteristics will take second place to  the demand for agri--28-
cultural output.  This reversed emphasis  is  typified by  some  of  our major
agricultural export  competitors,  such as  Brazil.  Like the U.S.  in its  own
early period of economic growth and expansion, lower income  countries reveal
less  interest  in environmental quality than in expanded agricultural produc-
tion, and are likely to  impose far fewer constraints  on their agricultural
sectors in its name.-/ This is unfortunate  both for environmental quality
in  the Third World, and for  competing U.S.  agricultural  producers, who will
be  forced to  bear the additional  costs  that  tastes wrought  of higher incomes
bring as  their technologies  adjust  to stricter environmental regulations.
In  the long run, however, international comparative advantage  in agri-
cultural production will be  on those soils  that are  both productive  and
resistant to erosion  losses,  implying fewer offsite damages  to water quality
(Larson, et.  al.,  1983).  As  the demand for  environmental quality grows, it
can work constructively  to shift production onto those  lands  on which  the
United States' comparative advantage is greatest.  Policies such as  the Con-
servation Reserve Program must therefore  be  targeted so as  to  protect  both
on-site productivity and minimize off-site damages  (Crosson and  Stout,
1/  This generalization seems  more valid at  the  level of  national policy than for individuals  in Third World countries.  A 1981  study of  water supply and the  impact  of quality characteristics on Bengali villagers, for example,  found that  "for drinking water, quality is  a powerful determinant  of  the  attractiveness of a water source, distance  is  not a powerful determinant for  any of  the  income groups  [in  the study],  and conflicts over access  to drinking water sources adversely affect  the choices exercised by poor families."  Even in a village  economy,
however, systematic differences were  found between income groups'  pre- ferences  for water quality for drinking and non-drinking uses.  The inclusion of  these water quality considerations has  important implica- tions for the  choice of  technology, and argues  strongly  "against a water supply program, like the  existing UNICEF program, which is  exclu- sively devoted to  installation of  tubewells."  These programs have "assumed that the most important  factor governing the  use of a drinking water source is  the distance of  the  source from the  home,"  rather  than water quality characteristics  (Briscoe,  et.  al.,  1981,  p. 180).-29-
1983).  The fact that Engel's  Law and Ruttan's  Law are working together in
the U.S.  and Europe also suggests  that conservation acreage  retirement
programs  are in the long-term interests  of  both, and can be made a construc-
tive basis for  future agricultural policy cooperation and negotiations.  The
same pressures leading  to  the encroachment of  environmental interest groups
on the agricultural policy process  in  the U.S.  are  responsible for the
growing influence of  the  "Green" parties in Western Europe.  Since  both the
U.S.  and EC are chronic overproducers  of grain, an opportunity exists  to  use
environmental quality as  a basis for surplus stock reductions.
A second observation concerns  the relative capacity of  new institutions
to  respond to  missing markets  for environmental quality.  From a policy
perspective the issues are  (1)  which markets  are missing?  and (2)  what  are
the most efficient and equitable institutions  to deal with them?  Issue  (1)
is an empirical matter, based on the examination of  specific environmental
quality characteristics  in relation to  particular agricultural technologies.
In the  case of  nitrate pollution of ground water, for example, Saliba  (1985,
p. 1234)  argues  that  "ground water contamination is  more  than a technical
problem;  it  is  also one of  resource misallocation, unrevealed values  con-
cerning water quality, and distorted incentives  related  to water use."  If
these symptoms  of market failure exist  in a given case,  then issue (2) becomes
relevant:  What can be done?  In  the case  of water quality, alternatives
range from newly invented markets,  as  proposed by advocates of  privatization
(eg. Anderson, Burt, and Fractor, 1983)  to  direct control over groundwater
pumping by state agencies  (eg. Henderson,  1984).  The implicit  value
attached to environmental quality  characteristics, if  it  can be discovered,
will be  important to  determining willingness  to  pay  for  those policy alter--30-
natives.  However, the  choice among alternatives will be  guided by con-
siderations of equity as well as  efficiency.  These are  issues  about which
individuals equally concerned with environmental quality may nonetheless
disagree.  Institutional solutions  seldom are uniquely determined.  Again
quoting Saliba:
Suppose households  significantly increase bottled water purchases
following publicity regarding nitrates in  the  city water supply.  It may be inferred that many consumers are willing to pay at  least  the cost of  bottled water to avoid nitrates  in drinking water.  These inferential values  can be  compared to  the costs of  imposing fertilizer management restrictions  on agriculture  to  determine which approach more efficiently resolves nitrate externalities - bottled water for house- holds or regulation of  farm practices.  The distributional effects of these two alternatives  on consumers  and  farmers vary greatly and would likely become the focal  point of  policy discussion  (1985,  p. 1235).
While the hedonic approach discussed above offers one  method of eli-
citing willingness  to pay, a variety  of  other approaches exist  and are
rapidly  being refined.  The particular technique  employed is  less  important
than recognition of  the  fact  that  environmental quality  characteristics  do
have value for which individuals  seem willing  to pay.  Estimates  of  this
willingness,  especially where markets are missing, will be  important  in
determining the costs of  various institutional alternatives.
A final issue is whether endogenous pressures  inducing technical and
institutional change suggest  that  problems  of environmental  quality will
"take care of  themselves."  This  interpretation of  the  induced innovation
model is erroneous.  The theory of  induced technological and  institutional
change provides a basis  for interpreting decisions that  have occurred and  are
in the process  of  occurring.  But  that  individuals  respond rationally to
constraints  is  hardly a policy prescription in itself, especially where
missing markets and differences  over  the  costs  and equity  of institutional-31-
alternatives  remain.  There is  nothing in  it  that suggests  complacency over
our capacity for institutional solutions  to problems  of environmental
quality.  The correct interpretation,  in my view, is  that  because  the  value
attached to environmental quality characteristics in the high income
countries of  the West  is  high and getting higher, rewards will go  to  suc-
cessful innovators of  agricultural  policies that  recognize and respond  to
these values.  I am optimistic that  policymakers,  and  the  research community
generally, will respond to  this  demand in  the high income countries.  Of
greater concern is  the low value  that may be  attached to harmful environmen-
tal quality characteristics  by  poorer nations, and the poor among us, who
bear a disproportionate share  of  its burdens.  But  in relation to  primary
material goods,  such as  food,  can we  blame them?  The way to environmental
quality, if Ruttan's Law is  valid,  is  through increases  in income, which may
require not  only growth, but  redistribution.-32-
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